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There is rapid urbanisation in developing countries, where
UN Habitat estimates that 80% of the world urban
population will live by 2030. Urban water utilities are
facing a challenge of continuously extending services to
the rapidly expanding towns and cities, particularly so
when most of the population growth is absorbed by slums,
leading to an increasing number of the urban poor.
Economic regulation of urban water service providers is
therefore necessary to guard the equity principle and
promote universal water service coverage that is an
overarching target for achievement of UN millennium
development goals (MDGs). This paper reports on
research carried out in Lusaka, Zambia, one of seven case
studies in a global research study on whether the needs of
the urban poor have been incorporated, as a primary duty
of regulation. The study found that NWASCO, the
Zambian regulator, has made commendable progress
towards ‘good regulation’ principles of independence,
accountability, consistency, transparency, proportionality
and equitable targeting of interventions. Clearly, there are
good lessons for policy makers in other developing
countries to learn from the way regulation structures,
systems and procedures were set up in Zambia, and how
they have evolved over time. Increased consumer
participation will make the regulatory regime more
pro-poor.
1. INTRODUCTION
The year 2007 has seen a historical urban transition in which
for the first time the urban population has exceeded the rural
population.1 As a result of urban migration and rapid
population growth, the world’s population living in cities and
towns will continue to expand from 3.2 billion people today to
nearly 5 billion by 2030, accounting for about 80% of the
global population.1,2 Most of the urban population growth will
occur in developing countries, particularly Africa and Asia,
where much of the increase is being absorbed by slums. For
instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, 62% of the urban dwellers in
2005 lived in slum conditions, which is defined as lack of at
least one of the basic conditions of decent housing—that is,
adequate sanitation, improved water supply, durable housing or
adequate living space.2 It is a great challenge for urban service
providers in developing countries to expand their services in
tandem with the rapid urbanisation trends, in order to meet the
UN millennium development goals (MDGs). For instance, WHO/
UNICEF estimated that the number of urban residents in the
developing regions without access to safe water increased from
107 million in 1990 to 170 million in 2004, while for sanitation,
the number increased from 475 million to 611 million in the
same period.3 Most of the unserved are the lowest-income
households, categorised as the urban poor, who reside in slums,
shanties, unplanned and illegal settlements.
Some of the reasons advanced by urban water utilities for
failing to serve the urban poor are: high costs involved in
extending services to low-income settlements owing to poor
infrastructure planning and difficult topography in those areas
of the city; illegal status of the low-income settlements; low
ability to pay for the connections; low ability to pay the
volumetric water rates; and transient nature of residents of
low-income settlements.4 Where low-income households are not
connected to piped water supply, the poor cannot benefit from
the convenience and health benefits of potable water, or from
the lower costs. Therefore, unlike residents of low-density
well-planned parts of the cities, these urban poor people rarely
get full benefits from piped water services. Instead, many
consumers in low-income areas rely on alternative small-scale
service providers, or water vendors, who are a common sight in
many of the cities in developing countries. For various reasons,
the prices charged by most vendors are substantially inflated
compared with the utility tariffs, sometimes with a
multiplication factor as high as 20 times.5 Apart from the
impact of the doubtful water quality of services supplied by
water vendors, the urban poor are doubly negatively affected by
meagre quantities of water they are forced to purchase and use,
on account of the exorbitant prices.
The provision of water as a basic service is one of the public
service obligations required of service providers in developed
countries. Public service obligations concern those services that
are of public interest, which, under normal circumstances, may
not be availed by the service providers if they were to consider
only their commercial interests. Certain public services such as
drinking water for households qualify for universal service
obligations, requiring universal rather than specific coverage, as
they are vital for human survival.6 The situation is different in
developing countries: formal mechanisms by which networked
utilities are required to meet the needs of the poor are implicit
and unclear. Although there is a general awareness of the ideal
of the public service obligation to achieve public health, it is
generally assumed that public providers are not required to
provide service to ‘illegal’, low-income settlements in the urban
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areas. The situation in low-income countries needs to change if
MDGs are to be met. Apart from social equity reasons, the
urban poor deserve disproportionately higher levels of
regulatory attention, since they comprise the majority of
potential new customers.7
Incentive-based economic regulation of water and sanitation
providers has proved to be a powerful tool for improving
services, particularly but not exclusively in the context of
public–private partnerships in developing countries.8 Countries
of Latin America and the Caribbean established regulatory
systems as early as the 1980s and are currently in a post-reform
phase of regulatory development.9 Other countries that have
made tremendous progress in establishment of economic
regulation include the Philippines and Indonesia. There are
notable examples in these countries where some international
private operators have provided differentiated services to
low-income settlements, through which the urban poor have
benefited significantly.10 This development has often happened
as a result of the skills of the private operator rather than by
way of any clear leadership of government through its agent,
the water regulator.8
Regulatory systems in developing countries are faced by
enormous challenges brought about by both internal and
external factors. Weak regulatory capacity and/or external
political pressure in developing countries may undermine the
regulatory capacity.11 In order to strike the right balance
between protecting individuals’ and utilities’ rights, the UK
Government has endorsed five principles of ‘good regulation’:
proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and
targeting of interventions.12 Other crucial factors for regulators
in developing countries is independence from political pressure,
timing of regulatory decisions, regulation of small-scale service
providers, and capacity-building for staff working for the
regulator.11 This paper reports on research carried out in
developing countries on systems and structures put in place to
regulate water service providers effectively for the benefit of all
consumers, particularly the poor.
2. RESEARCH ON REGULATION FOR THE
POOR—THE ZAMBIAN CASE STUDY
The international research project to investigate existing
regulatory systems for urban water services in developing
countries was financed by the UK Department for International
Development from 2003 to 2005. The overall goal of Knowledge
and research project number R8320, which was entitled
‘Regulating Public and Private Partnerships for the Poor’ was to
raise the welfare of the urban poor. Cranfield University in the
UK coordinated several international partners that participated
in the project. Field research was carried out in Ghana,
the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, Indonesia, Jordan, the
Philippines, Uganda and Zambia. The main objectives of the
research project were to investigate the present mechanisms for
requiring achievement of universal service, provision by the
direct provider utility for serving the urban poor, and customer
representation in ensuring quality of service delivered.12 The
current paper presents findings from the case study in Zambia.
2.1. The study setting
The water and sanitation sector in Zambia has been undergoing
reform since 1993, with the purpose of making direct service
provision a responsibility of new institutions that are
independent of government, while leaving the Ministry of Local
Government and Housing, the lead ministry in the sector, to
play the role of policy development, coordination and
facilitation for better service coverage. Other key institutions in
the urban water sector are the local authorities, who provide
water services through established commercial utilities,
municipal water/sanitation departments or works departments.
As part of the reform process, the National Water and
Sanitation Council (NWASCO) was established by the Water and
Sanitation Act Number 28 of 1997, and charged with the
responsibility of regulating service providers in the urban water
and sanitation sector.
Lusaka, the country’s capital city, had a population of about
1.1 million at the end of 2000, of which 60% lived in peri-urban
and low-income settlements.13 Officially, provision of water and
sanitation services in Lusaka City is the responsibility of Lusaka
Water and Sewerage Company (LWSC), a private liability
company that is wholly owned by Lusaka City Council. In 2002,
non-revenue water in LWSC’s operational area was estimated at
52% of total production, and the utility’s service coverage was
34% of the total population in Lusaka.14 By 2006, these
performance indicators had improved to 55% and 65%
respectively.15
Many residents of peri-urban areas spend a lot of time
collecting water, usually from shallow wells, which is often of
poor microbial and physical–chemical quality, resulting in a
high incidence of water-borne diseases.3 A baseline study
carried out in 2005 showed that 65% and 72% of the residents
in peri-urban areas/low-income settlements do not have access
to adequate service levels of water supply and sanitation,
respectively.15 The government of Zambia developed the
national peri-urban water and sanitation strategy in 2001 to
improve services to the low-income settlements.16 This strategy
followed on from the successful implementation of the LWSC
peri-urban unit, which was set up in 1995 to cater for the
provision of services to 15 of Lusaka’s compounds, with an
estimated total population of 540 000 people at the time of the
fieldwork. The management model utilised by the peri-urban
unit is tailored to community participation and/or franchising
the day-to-day operations to local entrepreneurs duly approved
by the community leadership.
2.2. Data collection methods
The specific research questions answered by the Zambia case
study are listed below.
(a) What is the institutional set-up of the regulator?
(b) Does the institutional set-up foster the regulator’s
independence, legitimacy, accountability, consistency and
transparency?
(c) What is the regulator in Zambia doing to regulate the utility
to deliver universal service, particularly to the urban poor?
(d) What mechanisms are in place to ensure participation of the
consumers in the regulatory mechanism?
(e) Given the huge service gap caused by the water utility’s
inadequate capacity to fulfil its mandate in Lusaka, how
effective is the regulator in ensuring that alternative service
providers deliver adequate levels of service to the large
section of the population they serve?
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In order to answer the above questions, data were collected
through review of policy and other organisational documents
from government, NWASCO (the regulator) and LWSC (the
service provider); interviews with 16 key informants from
government, NWASCO, LWSC, civil society, community leaders,
international development agencies and non-governmental
organisation (NGOs); and focus group discussions with key
community members (19 men and 34 women selected with
assistance from the local community leadership) in a sample of
four especially selected locations of peri-urban areas with an
estimated total population of 142 000 people. Using a generic
interview guide, key informants were interviewed for between 1
and 1.5 h on various regulatory matters in line with their specific
roles and functions. Each of the focus group discussions, on the
other hand, lasted about 1 h and covered consumer perceptions of
service levels, costs and payment options, disconnection/
reconnection procedures, coping strategies and consumer voice.
3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. The institutional and organisational set-up of
NWASCO
Comprehensive sector reforms have taken place in Zambia since
1993, with the main objectives of separating water resources
management (WRM) from water supply and sanitation (WSS),
creation of an independent regulator, and devolution of WSS
service provision to local authorities.17 NWASCO, which evolved
from the Water Sector Reform Support Unit, actively took on
the roles and functions of an independent regulator in October
2000. Fig. 1 shows an influence map of how NWASCO interacts
with other key organisations in the sector. The mandate of
water supply and sanitation in urban areas is vested in the
Department of Infrastructure and Support Services (DISS), a
department that was established in 1995 within the Ministry of
Local Government and
Housing. The main functions
of DISS are to provide policy
direction, mobilise resources
and facilitate the development
of WSS services devolved to
local authorities.17 The water
sector reform paved the way
for fostering infrastructure
development in local
authorities (LAs), to enable
them to provide WSS in their
areas of jurisdiction. The LAs
were empowered by the Water
Supply and Sanitation (WSS)
Act Number 28 of 1997 to
establish commercial utilities
(CUs) or go into joint ventures
with private companies to
provide WSS services.17
In order to separate policy and
regulatory functions and
therefore minimise political
interference, the regulator,
NWASCO reports to the
national parliament, through
the minister of energy and
water development. The
policy-making body of the regulator is the NWASCO council,
which comprises seven members appointed by the minister of
energy and water development to represent relevant
government departments, civil society organisations and the
public. NWASCO secretariat is headed by a director assisted by
14 other permanent staff.15,18 Fig. 2 shows the organisational
structure of NWASCO in 2006. Not only has the staff
continuously obtained training to build technical capacity but
NWASCO has recently engaged private consultants located in
various towns to improve the regulator’s monitoring
capacity.15
NWASCO’s major functions are to advise the government on
water and sanitation matters; advise local authorities on
commercially viable institutional arrangements for provision of
water and sanitation services; license service providers; develop
guidelines for technical and financial management of utilities;
set up and review tariffs; advise service providers on customer
relations management; and disseminate water/sanitation
services related information to consumers. The operations of
NWASCO are mainly funded by one-off application fees paid by
all service providers at the time of application and licence
renewal; monthly licence fees paid by all service providers;
international technical assistance; and government subvention
to plug the budget deficit. NWASCO’s financial independence
from the government has been improving steadily, from 43% in
2001 to over 75% in 2005.14,18
3.2. Regulatory instruments and guidelines
The WSS Act 28 of 1997 together with subsequent related
statutory instruments paved the way for establishment and
development of regulatory instruments, structures and
procedures. It took about three years for NWASCO to develop
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key elements of the regulatory regime. At the time of the
fieldwork, 21 utilities had been granted long-term (ten-year)
licences while 26 others were given provisional one-year
licences. These utilities were issued with guidelines on topics
such as licensing requirements, minimum service levels,
business planning, financial projections, investment planning,
tariff development and adjustment, corporate governance of
commercial utilities, annual organisational reporting, water
supply for low-income urban areas, water quality management
and human resources management strategy.
After issuing the guidelines and minimum service levels, the
regulator implemented a capacity-building programme for
relevant utility staff. Service standards for each utility are
determined through a negotiation process, and depend on the
baseline service levels at the time of application for a licence.
Service standards are adjusted periodically through a series of
three-yearly service level agreements. Incentives given to
utilities for good performance include positive considerations
during tariff reviews and in the allocation of performance-based
subsidies, as well as better corporate image portrayed through
the widely publicised annual performance benchmarks. Penalties
range from financial fees, suspension of a service provider, to
outright cancellation of a licence.
NWASCO utilises an audit-based regulation approach in which
the primary burden of proof is placed on the service provider to
demonstrate compliance to standards. Service agreements
stipulate that certain minimum information is provided to the
regulator on a regular basis. Utilities are therefore required to
keep registers on key aspects of technical and functional quality
attributes. These data may instantaneously be relayed
electronically to the NWASCO information system (NIS) that has
continuously been upgraded, and, since 2006, has incorporated
a special database on service provision to the peri-urban
areas.18 The data obtained are checked for accuracy and
authenticity, analysed and then utilised to compile the annual
urban water sector reports. Most recently, NWASCO has
developed a special regulatory supervision (SRS) system, in
which providers that show serious weaknesses in their
performance are provided with technical assistance, and closely
supervised until there is sustainable improvement.15,18
During the fieldwork, a cross-
section of key government
officials, professional
organisations and the donor
community were interviewed,
who highly commended the
progress NWASCO had so far
made in building the
foundation for effective
regulatory rules, structures
and systems. However, many
participants of the focus group
discussions held in the peri-
urban areas did not know of
the existence of the regulator.
A few focus group participants
had learnt about NWASCO
through news clips in the
newspapers and electronic
media. None of the focus
group participants had seen or heard about urban water sector
reports.
3.3. Support for extension of services to low-income
settlements
The WSS Act 28 of 1997 requires the regulator to ensure
improved service provision to the urban poor.17 The devolution
trust fund (DTF), which became operational in 1993, was
established as a common-pool financing instrument to provide
support to service providers to extend services to the urban
poor.19 The DTF, which is semi-autonomous from NWASCO, is
headed by a manager and receives funding from government
subvention and external support agencies. Funds are given to
eligible utilities for rehabilitation and extension of networks in
peri-urban areas; construction of kiosks; software/social aspects
such as community sensitisation; and organisational development
of peri-urban units. The DTF has developed guidelines on how to
plan and implement infrastructure improvements for services
enhancement to urban poor settlements. Based on good practices
in the country, the DTF is promoting the water kiosk system as
an effective method of service provision to the urban poor in the
short and medium term.19
Utilities access DTF capital on condition that they demonstrate,
through a set of criteria, that the funds would be used to extend
services to low-income communities in a manner that would
foster community participation and promote cost recovery from
the users. The funds are disbursed in instalments, upon
satisfactory accountability of previous disbursements, to a
ring-fenced bank account. DTF monitors the progress of the
project through monthly progress reports submitted by the
utility, inspections/site visits, and examination of the utility’s
expenditure against the physical progress. Results from DTF
pilot projects implemented since 2003 in six low-income
settlements show that the overall objectives were fulfilled, with
about 120 000 people in low-income settlements accessing safer
water supply.20 The DTF operations are currently being scaled
up to other low-income settlements.
3.4. The customer’s voice
NWASCO has set up consumer groups known as water watch
groups in some service areas, with the main objectives of
NWASCO council
Inspector, technician;
technical officer
Accountant Chief inspector TypistSecretary
to council
Director
Administration and
financial committee
Technical advisory committee
Inspector, commercial; 
commercial officer 
HR officer  
Driver Receptionist,
typist
Office
orderly
Secretary
Manager, trust devolution fund
PR officer
Fig. 2. NWASCO organisational set-up as of 200614,15
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ensuring that consumers’ rights are protected, consumers’
obligations are explained, consumers’ complaints are
satisfactorily resolved, and adequate information on utility
services is disseminated to consumers.20 By 2006, water watch
groups (composed of five to eight selected volunteers) in eight
towns had been set up.18 Lusaka Water Watch Group (LWWG)
was formed in 2001 and members, who were selected on the
basis that they were knowledgeable and motivated by the
interest of working in the water sector, were required to serve
for a two-year term.
NWASCO provides LWWG members with stationery, transport
and other logistics to carry out the activities. The NWASCO
public relations officer is the liaison officer for LWWG. The
LWWG members are provided with training to enhance their
technical and interpersonal skills. In order to improve their
effectiveness LWWG members adopted diversified channels of
communication to include use of letters, telephone contacts and
consumer general meetings (usually organised during market
days), which resulted in an increased number of registered
complaints. The LWWG members use civic members in the
informal settlements as entry points to community members.
The LWWG members discuss issues with resident development
committee members (who are elected civic leaders in informal
settlements) and/or market management committees prior to
holding consumer meetings. Venues for consumer meetings are
prioritised according to the number of complaints received from
specific areas.
LWWG has made an impact on effectiveness of the consumers’
voice in the regulatory regime. Meetings are scheduled in
different informal settlements to sensitise the residents
regarding their responsibilities and what minimum service levels
are expected from LWSC, the utility. In these meetings the
utility’s representatives participate fully, and are asked to
explain their action plans to improve service levels. Through the
intervention of LWWG, a number of outstanding complaints are
resolved during the meetings or thereafter. The impact of the
water watch groups is manifested by the seriousness utilities
currently attach to consumer complaints.20 Furthermore,
collaboration of NWASCO with the Energy Regulation Board
(ERB) and Communication Authority of Zambia (CAZ) has led to
the transformation of water watch groups into consumer watch
groups, hence creating a one-stop centre to cover all customer
issues across all the three public utilities.15 The first such merger
took place in Lusaka in March 2006.15
There were a few challenges facing the water watch groups. The
level of funding received from NWASCO is inadequate
compared with the workload, to the extent that the consumer
group was unknown to most people that participated in focus
groups held in the low-income settlements of Lusaka. The
meagre budget allocations (e.g. total budget for water watch
groups in four towns in 2003/2004 was only US$2000 per
quarter20) limit the scope and depth of activities carried out by
water watch groups. Furthermore, there is a question of
sustainability of the water watch groups, given that the
members were not paid salaries. For instance, at the time of the
fieldwork, three places out of the designated membership of
eight people were vacant, as those volunteers had ‘moved on’ to
more beneficial occupations. In spite of these challenges,
LWWG has remained proactive, constantly reminding service
providers of their obligation to provide high-quality
services.15
3.5. Alternative service providers
The WSS Act 28 of 1997 stipulates that LWSC is the designated
service provider in the geographical area covered by the
boundaries of Lusaka City Council. However, as noted earlier,
owing to inadequate capacity of LWSC, it was estimated that
only 34% of residents of Lusaka City were adequately served
with water services by 2002.14 In response to these poor service
levels, a number of international development agencies such as
the Japanese International Development Agency, Ireland Aid
and Care International have since the early 1990s supported
community-based organisations to develop alternative water
supply systems (mainly using boreholes) and reticulate these
systems to locations in the peri-urban areas, independent of
LWSC and other recognised service providers. A typical example
is Care International, which supports community-managed
water trusts that provide water services to 13 peri-urban areas
in Zambia with a total population of about 600 000 people.21
In spite of the high market share served by independent
alternative service providers, they were not directly regulated by
NWASCO at the time of the fieldwork. The regulator’s official
position was that NGO-supported community-managed
alternative service points are only a stop-gap measure, and are
not a viable and sustainable way of providing services to peri-
urban areas.14,22 According to the regulator, all areas under the
geographical jurisdiction of a licensed utility are its responsibility
and it is held fully accountable for the level of services to these
service areas.14 Yet, the water utility has no capacity to supervise
or to ensure quality assurance in the areas served by the
independent alternative service providers. Consequently, at the
time of the fieldwork, the communities served by such
independent alternative providers were effectively excluded from
the benefits accruing from the regulatory regime.
4. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND KEY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The water sector reforms implemented by the Government of
Zambia culminated in the enactment of the WSS Act 28 of
1997, which in turn paved the way for establishment of
regulatory instruments, structures and procedures. The Act
together with its associated statutory instruments provided a
good legal framework for development of an effective
regulatory regime. NWASCO, the regulator, has gradually
developed a regulatory system composed of licensing of service
providers, issuing standards, guidelines and a tariff model; the
NWASCO information system (NIS), which processes data from
the utilities; regular monitoring of service providers;
performance measurement and incentive framework;
compilation of annual sector reports; special regulatory
supervision for low-performance utilities; water watch groups
that enhance the customer’s voice in the regulatory mechanism;
and the Devolution Trust Fund, which supports the utilities in
extending services to the urban poor.
The findings of this research show that the operating
environment is conducive to the regulator making independent
decisions, with minimal interference from the state. The
regulator has exploited this environment and made remarkable
progress in fulfilling ‘good attributes’ of regulation. The
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independence is enhanced as NWASCO becomes more
financially independent. With increased functionality, the
regulator is continuously building legitimacy among key
stakeholders, as could be evidenced by the high regard accorded
by key government officials, professional organisations and the
donor community in Zambia. In order to enhance this
legitimacy, the regulator needs to make a stronger partnership
with the consumers. Adequate information about the regulatory
systems should be disseminated to the consumers, particularly
those living in low-income settlements, who are necessarily the
biggest beneficiaries of regulation. The information should be in
a form that is simple, understandable and accessible to the
target audience. This process will empower the consumers and
make them active partners in the regulation process.
Structures and systems have been put in place to make the
regulator accountable to the state and other stakeholders.
However, there is still room to improve accountability to the
consumers. For instance, it is important that the influence of the
regulator is extended to areas served by independent alternative
service providers, who provide water services to over 50% of
Lusaka’s population. Such actions will not only promote the
principle of accountability to the consumers but also enhance
proportionality of benefits to the urban poor. Furthermore, the
rights and obligations of the consumers, the major stakeholders
in the water sector, and the major beneficiaries of the regulatory
regime should be made more explicit through various avenues,
such as increased emphasis in the Water Act and service
delivery guidelines.
The DTF has already improved the livelihoods of over 120 000
people living in low-income settlements. The participation of
beneficiary communities in DTF’s decision-making process
should be increased. This process could be initiated by
increasing the participation of the water watch groups that are
already very active in consumers’ education and sensitisation.
There is no doubt that water watch groups have increased
consumer representation in the regulator’s decision-making
processes. More conspicuously, the sensitisation campaigns by
water watch groups have led to increased awareness of roles,
responsibilities and obligations for both the utilities and the
consumers. Furthermore, the transformation of water watch
groups into consumer watch groups, to cater for the three utility
services of water, electricity and telecommunications is highly
commended. Clearly, there are good lessons for policy makers in
other developing countries to learn from, in the way that
regulation structures, systems and procedures were set up in
Zambia, and how they have evolved over time.
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